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COMMENTS
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY
ILL IN CALIFORNIA: 1969 STYLE
In the State of California, the Lanterman-Petris-Short Bill'
went into effect on July 1, 1969, providing new procedures for
commitment of the mentally ill person. 2 Almost immediately the
provisions of the bill were challenged in a suit contesting its
constitutionality.
3
Supporters of the new enactments are convinced that patients
in psychiatric facilities will be treated more humanely, returned to
their homes and communities faster, and receive more enlightened
psychiatric treatment than was true under previous commitment
procedures. Some opponents of the new provisions believe that
patients dangerous to themselves and others will be released too
soon. Other opponents attack the new laws on the basis that there
is insufficient safeguarding of the patient's constitutional rights. The
latter claim that he is denied due process in the application of the
provisions governing involuntary commitment of a person deemed
to be a danger to himself or a danger to others.
The dilemma presented in considering the benefit to be derived
from the new legislation is twofold.
First, how shall the state protect the suicidal patient from in-
juring himself and the dangerous patient from injuring others, with-
out abridging his fourteenth amendment right of "due process"?
Second, how effective is involuntary commitment in a psychi-
atric hospital in accomplishing either the desired "medical" goal of
improving that individual's mental well-being or the legal goal of
protecting society and the person from his person-endangering acts?
1 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5000-401 (West Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as LPS].
2The Lanterman-Petris-Short Bill was passed by the California Legislature in
1967 and then modified subsequently in the 1968 and 1969 sessions. As modified, it
went into effect July 1, 1969.
3 The act was challenged in a suit filed in San Diego County on July 3, 1969.
Judge Hugo Fisher declared the act unconstitutional. The suit is now pending before
the California Supreme Court: San Diego v. Superior Court ex rel. Callahan, Civil
No. 1276 (Superior Court, San Diego County, July 3, 1969). Arguments are presently
scheduled to be heard in January, 1970, before the California Supreme Court, No.
LA 29669.
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HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
For many years California has followed the policy of hospital-
ization of individuals deemed mentally ill.' If such hospitalization
was not accepted voluntarily by the patient, the courts, authorized
by specific statutes, ordered involuntary commitment to a state
hospital regardless of whether such commitment and involuntary
hospitalization resulted in benefit to the individual. For many years
when state hospitals were overcrowded and the number of psychi-
atrists and psychiatric staff were grossly inadequate, no real argu-
ment could be made that such involuntary commitment was for the
benefit of the patient. 5
Patients arrived at a state hospital because the individuals of
their local community or local milieu could not tolerate them any
further.6 State hospitals became the dumping ground of the un-
wanted and the untolerated from the local community.' The justifi-
4 For an excellent review of the history of hospitalization of mentally ill patients,
see Projects, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 822 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Projects].
5 "Perhaps the most alarming statistics on the ineffectiveness of current facilities
were presented in a California State Department of Mental Hygiene Bulletin': 'If alldoctors in California's State Mental Hospital spent all their working time with
patients, each patient would get only five minutes of attention a day.' The state hos-pitals are without adequate staff, equipment, or space. With all these barriers the goal
of effective treatment is frequently not achieved through hospitalization. Furthermore,hospitalization may not be beneficial to a majority of those for whom that alternative
is chosen." Projects, supra note 4, at 860-1.
See also Mendel, On the Abolition of the Psychiatric Hospital, COMPREHENSIVE
MENTAL HEALTH: THE CHALLENGE OF EVALUATION 237 (L. Roberts ed. 1968); and
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN-
TERIM COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1963-65 Sessions, THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL
COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA: A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (Subcomm. Print 1965)[hereinafter cited as DILEMMA].
6 Interview with Norman R. Rogers, M.D., Medical Program Director, Division
V, Agnews State Hospital, at Agnews State Hospital, Sept. 30, 1969.
7 Case 1. A sixty-eight-year-old woman who had been married to her presenthusband for twenty-two years showed increased confusion and absent-mindedness in
the care of her house. She would leave the fire on in the kitchen stove throughout theday. She would forget to get meals ready. Her memory of recent events was confused
and poor. She would talk to children of her previous marriage who had since died.
And she would often put several dresses on, one over the other.
A medical evaluation was requested, and she was found to have chronic brain
syndrome in which arteriosclerotic changes had resulted in gradual diminution of her
cerebral abilities.
Her husband had no relatives or friends to assist him in caring for her during theday while he was at work. At first, she was placed in a convalescent home. This had
a cheerful, homelike, living in arrangement in which the patient had her own room,her own closet, dresser and belongings. However, after several months, this institution
had to suggest some other placement because she wandered away from the grounds.
There was not sufficient staff to keep constant watch on her. In addition, she wentinto other bedrooms and put on clothes that belonged to other patients. At one time,
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cation for such treatment derived from the concept of the state
functioning in the role of parens patriae for the mentally ill person.'
In many instances, the individual had committed no crime. It was
rationalized, however, that "treatment" in a state hospital via in-
voluntary commitment was necessary to protect the public and the
person from his potentially "dangerous" acts.9
However, changes in psychiatric management of disturbed
patients,' ° the economic vicissitudes of California state hospital
she accused another patient of taking things from her room when in the opinion of
the staff this had not occurred.
Placement in another nursing home of somewhat similar arrangements resulted in
a repetition of the same type of events.
The patient was taken to the Psychiatric Ward of the county hospital. There she
was adjudged mentally ill and was committed to the state hospital for an indefinite
time period. (Personal case of the author.)
8 "Advocates of this extension of state authority trace its origin specifically to
the ancient doctrine of parens patriae. However, parens patriae was a product of
feudal society and as such focused on the administration of land, probably to preserve
it and the revenue it produced from the rash acts of the deranged vassal. The pro-
ceeds from the administration were used to support the incompetent seizor. This
sovereign benevolence is the only link between parens patriae and current commit-
ment laws. The ancient doctrine never contemplated hospitalization or rehabilitation."
Projects, supra note 4, at 828.
9 DILEMMA, supra note 5, at 15.
10 Modes of Treatment. Prior to the advent of the major tranquilizers (the
phenothiazine group), there was actually no effective treatment except "time" to re-
duce the ranks of such individuals in the state hospital system. In the early 1930's, the
use of metrosol and insulin to give convulsive or coma treatments was put into effect.
A small percentage of patients were benefited by these treatments, but overall, the
results were disappointing.
The advent of electric shock treatment in the 1940's was then given widespread
use. Many patients in the throes of deep and unyielding depression were benefited with
this treatment, but major medical complications such as spinal fractures and loss of
mental acuity made electric shock procedures a mixed blessing. At about the same
time, prefrontal lobotomy as a psychosurgical technique was utilized. Again, some
patients derived benefit in that their manic phases were abated or ameliorated, but
the individual, though calm and placid, often lost much of his imaginative mental
abilities. Prefrontal lobotomy was a highly controversial procedure and is not used
now to any extent.
Drug Therapy. The modern era of psychopharmacology began in 1951 with the
synthesis of chlorpromazine. It was used first in Europe and from 1954 on in the
United States. It changed the mode of hospital psychiatric treatment drastically. Upon
being introduced into the state hospital systems throughout the United States, it was
found to be of major benefit for grossly disturbed patients. Many patients improved
faster and left the hospital sooner as a result of phenothiazine therapy.
For an expanded discussion of modes of treatment, see Tourney, Therapeutic
Fashions in Psychiatry, 124 Am. J. PSYCIlAT. 784, 790 (1968).
Decline in State Hospital Census. In 1967 because of these trends, and in recog-
nition of certain political commitments, the Department of Mental Hygiene in Cal-
ifornia reduced funds for the state hospital system. The reduction was justified,
according to proponents, by a decrease in the state hospital census. Opponents of the
reduction of funds pointed out that the state hospitals never had had adequate per-
sonnel. Their contention was that this perpetuated inadequate staffing and inadequate
treatment.
Nevertheless, the trend in reduction of state hospital census continued, and in
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financing," and the genuine concerned desires of public-minded
individuals to improve the care and end results of treatment for
mentally ill patients led to studies and hearings for improved
legislation. 12
After lengthy hearings by both Assembly and Senate interim
committees the present legislation was enacted. 13 Its intent was to
September, 1969, one state hospital, Agnews, had dropped to a census of 1,200 patients
where two years before it had been approximately 2,500.
Part of this decline took place as a result of transferring senile patients out of the
state hospital back to convalescent or nursing homes in the patient's home community.
Another factor in the lowered census was the use of such alternative disposition of
patients prior to the transfer to the state hospital.
See Epstein and Simon, Alternatives to State Hospitalization for the Geriatric
Mentally Ill, 124 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 955 (1968).
For discussion of the approach of the San Francisco courts to disposition of the
mentally ill even before LPS went into effect, see Note, The Need for Reform in the
California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REV. 992 (1967).
The state hospital then did not harbor the patient even temporarily. Earlier, such
a patient would have been sent to the state facility almost automatically.
Since July, 1969, the shorter treatment stay and the treatment of mentally illpatients in a community facility under provisions of the Short-Doyle Act have meantfewer admissions to the state hospitals. The concepts and financial support of theShort-Doyle provisions have stimulated development of psychiatric facilities in the local
community or county. The "community" concept developed along with the treatment
approach of the "therapeutic milieu."
Therapeutic Milieu. All of these changes in mode of treatment are concurrent with
changes in psychiatric thought which have occurred since World War II. DuringWorld War II, the concept of the "therapeutic community" was elaborated in England
and has been popularized, extended, modified and in various guises used as a treatment
vehicle. The belief is that many aspects of emotional disturbance are aggravated andintensified by lack of acceptance of the individual and his actions by those aroundhim. It argues that his recovery can be speeded by the influence of a supporting,
accepting social climate with interpretation and counsel by trained professional
"therapists" taking part in the "therapeutic community."
There have been and still are many conflicting theories as to the origin and
mechanisms of syndromes of mental illness labeled schizophrenia, paranoia, depression,
and anxiety reactions. Yet there is general agreement that separating the individual
from his community and from his home milieu deprives him of whatever acceptance
he might still have as a functioning individual. It is contended that thrusting him into
an impersonal, institutionalized type of ward (usually locked) does not promote re-
covery, but in many cases, perhaps makes his condition worse. For further discussion
re worsening of condition of hospitalized patients see Mendel and DILEMMA, supra
note 5.
11 Ronald Reagan became Governor of the State of California on January 1,1967. Reductions of financial support for the mental health program in state hospitals
coincided with his administration's budget cuts at that time.
12 DILEMMA, supra note 5.
13 LPS, supra note 1 [hereinafter cited in this footnote by section number only].
The LPS provides changes in the treatment of the mentally ill in three main
categories. It provides new time limits and new procedures for the involuntary com-
mitment of the mentally ill person, a so-called "bill of rights" for the patient com-
mitted to a state or other governmentally operated psychiatric facility, and allows ajudicially designated conservatorship for a person termed "gravely disabled because of
chronic alcoholism or mental disorder."
The person considered to be a danger to himself or to others may be taken by apeace officer to a county designated facility for psychiatric evaluation. Section 5150.
1969]
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improve patients' treatment, to shorten hospital stay, to encourage
patient treatment and reintegration in his own community, and still
to protect society from the "dangerous" person and a suicidal person
from endangering himself.
The peace officer or professional person designated by the facility may place that
person in the county designated facility for a seventy-two hour observation detention
period. Section 5151. There is reference in the act to "[M]ember of the attending
staff, as defined by regulation, of an evaluation facility designated by the county . .. ."
as also being empowered to place a person in custody in the psychiatric facility for
the seventy-two hour observation period. Section 5150. The act does not define
whether "attending staff" refers to physicians, members of the medical staff, or to
other nonmedical personnel. The patient may be released before or at the end of the
seventy-two hour period if "in the opinion of the professional person in charge of the
facility or his designee, the person no longer requires evaluation or treatment.
Section 5152.
A person so detained for observation may elect to continue hospitalization and
treatment on a voluntary basis. In such case, the duration of treatment depends on
the agreement between psychiatric recommendation for further treatment and the
patient's decision to continue to accept such treatment. If, however, at the end of the
seventy-two hour period or during voluntary treatment, the patient refuses further
hospitalization, the professional person in charge of the county designated psychiatric
facility, believing further treatment and involuntary commitment is necessary, may
"certify" the person for further involuntary commitment. The first such certification
is for a fourteen day period of intensive treatment. Section 5250. A second fourteen
day period may be certified for the suicidal patient. Section 5260. The notice of
certification "[M]ust be signed by the professional person in charge of the agency or
facility providing evaluation services and a physician, if possible a board-certified
psychiatrist, who participated in the evaluation." Section 5251.
The person being certified for intensive treatment must be informed of his "[LIegal
right to judicial review by habeas corpus, and shall explain the term to him, and shall
inform the person certified of his right to counsel, including court appointed counsel."
Section 5252.1.
If the person involuntarily committed requests release, any member of the treat-
ment staff of the psychiatric facility must allow the person committed to fill out a
request for release. This must be transmitted to the professional person in charge of
the facility, and "As soon as possible, the person notified shall inform the superior
court for the county in which the facility is located of the request for release.
"Any person who intentionally violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Section 5275. The Act provides for appointment of the public defender as counsel if
the patient detained cannot afford private counsel and specifies that "The court shall
grant a writ of habeas corpus or order an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days
after the petition is filed." Section 5276. The Act does not provide for a jury trial at
this stage of detention and treatment.
Where an individual has threatened, attempted or inflicted physical harm upon the
person of another after being taken into custody, or was taken into custody as a result
of attempting or inflicting injury on another and "[W]ho presents, as a result of men-
tal disorder, an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others," the professional
person in charge of the psychiatric facility may petition the court to require a further
ninety day period of treatment following the fourteen day certification period. Section
5300. The patient is entitled to have court-appointed counsel to represent him. Sec-
tion 5302. The proceedings on the petition for the postcertification ninety day in-
voluntary commitment must be held within four judicial days of filing of the petition.
Section 5303. The person subject to the ninety day commitment period may request
a jury trial at the time of the judicial hearing. Section 5303. In such jury trial the
decision of the jury must be unanimous to support the further ninety day commit-
ment. Section 5303. The Act further provides for a further involuntary commitment
period for the person potentially dangerous to others If the professional person in
[Vol. 10
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES UNDER LPS
The provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and its en-
abling legislation, the Short-Doyle modifications, 4 recognize im-
proved trends in the management of patients with emotional
charge of the psychiatric facility "[F]iles a new petition for postcertification treatment
on the grounds that he has threatened, attempted, or actually inflicted physical harm
to another during his period of postcertification treatment, and he is a person who, by
reason of mental disorder, presents an imminent threat of substantial physical harm
to others." Section 5304. The Act does not specify the length of the second post-
certification period.
The LPS Act provides for the appointment of a conservator of the person, of the
estate or of the person and the estate for any person who is gravely disabled as a re-
sult of mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism. Section 5350. The person
for whom conservatorship is being sought has the right to demand a jury trial on the
issue of whether he is gravely disabled. Section 5350. A temporary conservator
appointed by the court may detain a patient in a psychiatric facility pending the
appointment of a permanent conservator. Section 5353. The permanent conservator
has the right to place his conservatee in a medical, psychiatric, nursing or other state
licensed facility so specified in the court order. Section 5358. Conservatorships are made
for a period of one year and may be renewed on petition to the court. Section 5361.
The Act provides that "No person, nor agency, shall be designated as con-
servator whose interests, activities, obligations or responsibilities are such as to com-
promise his or their ability to represent and safeguard the interests of the conservatee.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the Department of Mental
Hygiene from serving as guardian pursuant to Section 7284." Section 5355. A con-
servatee may petition the court for a rehearing on his status but not more often than
once each six months. Section 5364. An attorney shall be provided for the conservatee
or the proposed conservatee. Section 5365.
The patient does not lose his civil rights because of commitment in the psychiatric
facility. Section 5005. The act specifies certain rights retained by the patient while in
the hospital including the right to wear his own clothes, keep his own possessions, to
keep and be allowed to spend reasonable sums of his own money, to have his own
personal storage space, to see visitors each day, and to have reasonable access to
telephones to make and receive calls. Section 5325. He has the right of access to letter
writing materials and to mail and receive unopened correspondence. He has the right to
refuse electric shock treatments and to refuse lobotomy. Section 5325. However, there
may be limitations to these rights since the Act provides, "A person's rights under
Section 5325 may be denied for good cause only by the professional person in charge
of the facility or his designee." Section 5326.
The LPS Act specifically excludes epileptics from commitment under its provisions.
It does not apply to mentally disordered sex offenders, narcotic addicts, habit-forming
drug addicts, mentally abnormal sex offenders, juvenile court, wards, or mentally dis-
ordered criminal offenders. Section 5002. Judicial commitment of mentally disordered
persons and persons impaired by chronic alcoholism is prohibited by Section 5002.
However, there is provision for a judicially ordered evaluation for mentally disordered
persons. Sections 5200-08. After such evaluation, the person may be detained for a
seventy-two hour period and be subject to other provisions of the LPS Act if he is
considered to be a danger to himself or others or a gravely disabled person due to
chronic alcoholism or mental disorder.
A criminal defendant who appears to be gravely disabled as a result of chronic
alcoholism may have a psychiatric evaluation ordered judicially. Section 5225. After
such evaluation, he may be released to the sheriff if the criminal charge has not been
dismissed or be subject to involuntary detention for psychiatric treatment under other
provisions of the LPS Act. Section 5230.
14 CAL. WErx. & INsT'Ns CODE §§ 5600-706 (West Supp. 1970).
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disturbance. The Act shortens hospital stay and with the Short-
Doyle enabling legislation encourages treatment close to the home
community.'5 It "restores" patient rights while in the hospital and
proscribes loss of certain civil rights which, under previous legisla-
tion, were forfeited by the patient adjudged mentally incompetent. 16
Provisions of the Act exempt the chronic alcoholic from commitment
at the whim of family or "friends" and remove the harmless senile
from society's dustbin of involuntary hospitalization. 17 All of these
changes are for the better and reflect improved treatment for psychi-
atric patients.
There are, however, real disadvantages in the procedures for
involuntary commitment under the LPS Act. The sticky question
still remains whether the state is justified in depriving a person of
his liberty without counsel and judicial hearing prior to commitment.
The conclusion that patients benefit from involuntary hospitalization
for mental illness is implied by the bill's provisions, and then such
rationalization is used as justification for depriving a patient of his
liberty through involuntary commitment.' 8
There is a subtle, unexpressed, but powerful conclusional theme
running through the LPS bill and many other states' commitment
procedures for the "mentally ill" person, which is as follows:
The patient is sick.
He needs treatment.
He doesn't want to be treated.
He has to be treated for his own good. (Society's good)
15 Under the Short-Doyle Act modifications, supra note 14, enacted concurrently
with the LPS Act, supra note 1, counties designate their own psychiatric facilities for
treatment purposes and are allowed reimbursement from state funds for those ex-
penses. As of July 1, 1969, the Short-Doyle Act modifications provided that such
counties would receive ninety percent of their costs from state funds. Earlier it had
been on a fifty-fifty basis. Certain counties are continuing to use a state hospital as a
contracting agency to handle the disposition and treatment under the LPS Act. Other
counties more remote from the state hospitals have developed their own facilities and
handle the treatment of such patients at home.
16 CAL. WEsr. & INST'NS CODE § 5325 (West Supp. 1970).
'7 Id. § 5002.
IS "Our libertarian views usually lead us to assert that treatment cannot be forced
on anyone unless the alternative is very great social harm. Thus while we will require
smallpox vaccinations and the segregation of contagious tuberculars, we will not
ordinarily require bed rest for the common cold, or a coronary, or even require a
pregnant woman to eat in accordance with a medically approved diet. Requiring treat-
ment whenever it seemed medically sound to do so would have utilitarian virtues.
Presumably, if death or serious incapacitation could thereby be avoided society would
have less worry about unsupported families, motherless children, or individuals no
longer able to support themselves." Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifica-
tions for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 88 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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Society will enforce treatment since the patient is not com-
petent to make the (right) decision to have treatment.19
These predetermined conclusions are then expressed as:
First, society will furnish treatment through involuntary com-
mitment to a psychiatric hospital for the patient's and society's
benefit.
Second, the benefits to the patient (and society) of such treat-
ment justify loss of his liberty despite denial of due process.
It is desirable to consider both the constitutional issues in-
volved in denial of due process and the effectiveness of such involun-
tary treatment in an evaluation of the involuntary commitment
provisions of the LPS Act.
DEPRIVAL OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The LPS Act
Under the LPS Act a person may be detained for seventy-two
hours on the written statement of a police officer or professional
person designated by the county.2 Weekends and holidays are ex-
cluded from that seventy-two hour period so that the initial observa-
tion period may be five or six days.21 During this time, the patient
has no legal right to counsel under the provisions of the bill. The
psychiatric staff may then certify the person for further observation
for fourteen days without any prior judicial review.2 If he is termed
a suicidal person, he may be certified for an additional fourteen day
period following the first fourteen day certification.'
Although the patient may request a hearing after being certified,
he must request such hearing through a habeas corpus, which is not
automatic. 24 A suicidal person can be detained involuntarily for as
long as thirty-three days without judicial review if he does not seek a
writ of habeas corpus.
The Act provides for a judicial hearing for the establishment
19 "'Mental illness' is the triggering conclusionary phrase which allows the state
to legally remove an individual involuntarily to an institution for treatment despite
the fact that he has not violated a criminal statute." Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As
You Like It," 49 B.U. L. REV. 14, 16 (1968).
20 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1970).
21 Id. § 5151.
22 Id. § 5250.
23 Id. § 5260.
24 Id. § 5275.
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of a conservatorship for the "gravely disabled person."" This pro-
cedure is being used to detain the person who is thought to be
"potentially dangerous" but who has not actually threatened or per-
formed an assaultive act during the initial fourteen day certification
period. For this person, twenty-one to twenty-three days could
elapse before a judicial hearing is held.
Under the provisions of the present legislation, involuntary
commitment of the mentally ill person is effected prior to his com-
mitting antisocial acts. This situation is at marked variance with
those provisions of criminal law which provide that a concurrence
of mens rea and actus reus must coincide in the commission of a
crime." Even in those instances where mens rea is implied because
of the antisocial character of the action, the legal process requires
not only the implied mens rea but also the actual commission of the
actus reus before an individual is held guilty of that crime. 7 In the
civil commitment of an individual on the basis of being a danger to
himself or others, or because he is gravely disabled due to chronic
alcoholism or mental disorder, this concurrence is not present. In
fact the person is deprived of his freedoms on the basis of a state of
mind rather than because of actions which he has perpetrated.
The Constitution
As early as 1901 the California Supreme Court ruled uncon-
stitutional certain legislative acts providing for involuntary commit-
ment of a mentally ill person. In Matter of Lambert,29 the petitioner
had been committed to the state hospital under provisions of the
Insanity Law enacted in 1897."0 He claimed he had been deprived
25 Id. § 5350.
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 20 (West 1955). "In every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent .... .
27 Id. § 21. "The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances con-
nected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused."
28 "It seems paradoxical that a state whose criminal laws are predicated upon
act and intent, as opposed to mens rea alone, should deprive a person of liberty for a
condition deemed preparatory to future acts. Such an apparent inconsistency can only
be explained with reference to the underlying philosophies of both criminal and com-
mitment laws. The criminal law is reflective of western society's adherence to the
idea of free will, the power of choice. As such it is particularly solicitous to afford
the individual every opportunity to exercise that power, i.e., to act in a manner other-
wise than that suggested by all available indicia. Conversely, commitment law postu-
lates an absence of any meaningful power of choice. Thus, commitment is viewed not
as a deprivation of freedom, but rather as a means to prevent inevitable conduct. To
allow an individual to remain in society once it is established that he suffers from a
mental illness likely to make him a danger to himself or to his neighbors would be, it
is assumed, both unwarranted and unconscionable." Projects, supra note 4, at 827.
29 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851 (1901).
30 Act of March 31, 1897, ch., [1897] Cal. Stats. at 311, as amended, Act of
March 26, 1903, ch. 364, § 2174, [1903] Cal. Stats. at 504.
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of his liberty without due process of law and argued the legislative
act was unconstitutional. The court declared the commitment pro-
visions of the Insanity Law unconstitutional in that there was
neither provision for notice to the alleged insane person of the pro-
ceedings, against him nor provision requiring the person to be
brought before a judge for an opportunity to be heard prior to
imposition of the commitment order."1
Arguments for the necessity of due process and preservation of
constitutional liberties in the process of involuntary commitment
are elaborated in numerous law review articles 2 and recent cases.
In re Gault"a emphasized that the judicial process for juveniles must
"measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. '8 4
Gault affords to juveniles the right to counsel, constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, right to judicial hearing, and right
to cross-examine witnesses.8 5
The individual being considered for involuntary commitment
because of mental illness should have the same basic liberties pro-
tected as the juvenile, and the person to be involuntarily confined
must have protection of rights at every step of the commitment
process.86
31 Matter of Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 633, 66 P. 851, 854 (1901).
82 Harris, Mental Illness, Due Process and Lawyers, 55 A.B.A.J. 65 (1969);
Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 18, at 80; Notes, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 187 (1969);
Kaplan, supra note 19, at 15; Chayet, Legal Neglect of the Mentally Ill, 125 Am. J.
PSYCHIAT. 785 (1968).
33 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
84 Id. at 30.
35 "For many years the constitutional safeguards afforded crimihals were denied
juveniles ...by the state as parens patriae. The primary purpose was to benefit the
child; rehabilitation, not punishment was the goal. The Supreme Court in In re Gault,
felt that this distinction could no longer be sustained. The first consideration was that
a juvenile proceeding could possibly involve a loss of personal liberty. Secondly the
Court recognized the fact that the promise of treatment was often illusory because of
the scarcity of adequate rehabilitative facilities." Notes, supra note 32, at 203.
36 "In 1940, the United States Supreme Court held in Minnesota v. Probate Court
of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270, 276-77, that due process is required in judicial pro-
ceedings that involve persons alleged to be mentally ill.
In May, 1966, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that due process and equal
protection of the laws require that an involuntarily held mental patient be afforded
the assistance of court-appointed counsel in a proceeding brought to determine whether
he should continue to be so incarcerated." Harris, supra note 32, at 65.
"A jury trial to determine the need for confinement should be mandatory when-
ever the patient or his agent requests one. An indigent patient should be provided by
the court with the assistance of a psychiatrist as well as legal counsel. A person, once
committed, is entitled to periodic re-examination by a court, with the assistance of an
attorney, with a view to his release when his condition so permits. The burden of
proving the necessity for continued detention then rests with the hospital," Harris,
supra note 32, at 66.
1969]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
In Hereyford v. Parker,7 discussing the involuntary commit-
ment of a mentally deficient boy to a state training school, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals states:
But like Gault, and of utmost importance, we have a situation in which
the liberty of an individual is at stake, and we think the reasoning in
Gault emphatically applies. It matters not whether the proceedings be
labeled "civil" or "criminal" or whether the subject matter be mental
instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary
incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, reha-
bilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a
feeble-minded or mentally incompetent-which commands observance
of the constitutional safeguards of due process. Where, as in both pro-
ceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons, the state under-
takes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe
due process, and this necessarily includes the duty to see that a subject
of an involuntary commitment proceedings is afforded the opportunity
to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings,
unless effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.38
San Diego v. Superior Court 9 points out certain inequities
within the Act itself which provide due process of law for some in-
dividuals and not others who are subject to its provisions. A criminal
defendant who appears to be a danger to others or himself, or who
is gravely disabled as a result of chronic alcoholism is entitled to a
judicial hearing prior to commitment.40 But for the noncriminal
mentally ill, the postcertification procedures provide for a writ of
habeas corpus after certification for treatment. 41 A judicial hearing
is required before establishment of a conservatorship. Moreover, the
conservatee has a right to a jury trial should he disagree with the
decision of that judicial hearing that he is "gravely disabled."42 The
LPS Act itself affords more protection of basic rights to the alleged
criminal mentally ill person than it does to one alleged mentally
ill but not accused of having committed a crime.
The use of the "conservatorship" procedure for the "gravely
disabled person due to mental disorder" in order that involuntary
commitment of a potentially dangerous person can be effected for
more than ninety days may be a subversion of the intent of the act.
The "conservatee" may petition for a judicial hearing only once
every six months. However, the involuntary commitment of the
potentially dangerous person is subject to judicial review at the end
of ninety days, and the act does not specify the length of detention
37 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
38 Id. at 396.
39 See note 3 supra.
40 CAL. WELl. & INST'NS CODE § 5225 (West Supp. 1970).
41 Id. § 5275.
42 Id. § 5350.
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which the court may order after a second judicial hearing for a per-
son "dangerous to others."
In addition, section 5355 implies that the guardian of a "con-
servatee" shall represent and safeguard the interests of the "conser-
vatee." Yet the next sentence of the same section allows the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene to serve as such guardian. Conceivably,
this might create a conflict of interest for personnel within the De-
partment of Mental Hygiene which would not allow the conservatee
to have his interests properly safeguarded. There is vagueness and
confusion in the equal application of "due process" of law under the
LPS Act.
Furthermore, under the LPS Act as well as the previous legisla-
tion, weekends and holidays are excluded from the seventy-two hour
hold. A juristic system which provides counsel for the indigent
accused, extensive and expensive trial procedures to protect his
rights, and, in some instances, provides trial transcripts for the con-
duct of an appeal from an adverse verdict, surely can extend its legal
protections to the alleged emotionally disturbed individual seven
days a week.
It is obvious that individual rights are not fully protected under
LPS. Even under the previous legislation, such rights often were injeopardy.4" There is a real question whether under the present LPS
legislation or the previous legislation providing for involuntary com-
mitment, a patient is or was afforded the protection of due process,
indicated as necessary in Hereyford. An individual subjected to the
status of involuntary commitment must have the same basic rights
43 Case 2. A thirty-six-year-old woman was taken into custody by a deputy
sheriff under a judicial commitment order from the superior court judge of that
county. She was apprehended at her home after supper and brought to the state
hospital. When she arrived there, she was extremely distraught and angry. She was so
angry that she was incoherent. However, her anger increased her awareness of what
was happening and modified the effects of the alcohol she had ingested that evening.
She claimed that her husband wanted her out of the house because he was having
an affair with the children's governess. She admitted that she had a history of drink-
ing but denied being unable to handle her affairs. She was given the opportunity to
contact her lawyer. This was a Friday night, and at the time that she arrived at the
state hospital, it was approximately 9:30 p.m. She was unable to contact her lawyer
that evening. There was a real question in the medical examiner's mind on duty that
night that this patient should be committed, but pursuant to the judicial commitment
order, she was admitted to the hospital, which at that time meant being kept within
a locked ward. This was prior to the passage of the LPS Act, and judicial hearings at
that hospital were held on a Tuesday. Having come in on a Friday night, the seventy-
two hours of observation and treatment did not go into effect until the following
Monday and that meant that she missed the next Tuesday hearing. As a result, her




as the juvenile in Gault. His rights must be guarded jealously at
every stage of the commitment process."
TREATMENT OF PATIENTS INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED
Need
The need for treatment of the mentally ill patient to protect
him from himself or to protect others in society from his acts is said
to override the constitutional issues involved in abridging an in-
dividual's liberty through involuntary hospitalization. Such justifica-
tion assumes that the persons needing treatment can be accurately
identified, that the "disease" process can be properly labeled, that
treatment facilities are adequate, and that the results of treatment
are satisfactory. These assumptions are based on a belief that psy-
chiatry and recommendations of psychiatrists represent an exact
science with definite correlation of predictability and results. There
is both legal opinion and much psychiatric evidence to the con-
trary.45 The argument that we must give credence to the findings of
psychiatry becomes invalid if, in fact, such findings are not con-
sistent or strongly reliable.40
The embarrassing questions require consideration. How con-
sistent is diagnostic labeling of mental illness? How accurately can
a person dangerous to himself or others be identified by diagnostic
label or pattern of behavior? When involuntary commitment is im-
posed, how adequate are facilities and staff to provide effective treat-
ment? Finally, what is the score on the outcome of such treatment
in preventing future danger to self or others?
4' "The rights of the involuntarily held mental patient can never be fully pro-
tected unless he is represented by a lawyer who carefully tests each element of the
case presented against his allegedly mentally ill client." Harris, supra note 32, at 66.
"These statistics indicate that there is a clear danger of prolonged commitment of
non-mentally ill patients. They show that the patient who did not have legal assis-
tance, either because of financial inability or because he was a juvenile and lacked
sufficient experience to enable him to retain an attorney, was denied equivalent access
to the channels of discharge. Such a denial, in the case of patients who could medically
and legally qualify for release if given an opportunity, is a most serious invasion of a
patient's constitutional rights for by reason of invidious economic discrimination, it
deprives him of his most precious freedom-liberty of his person." Lewin, Disposition
of the Irresponsible: Protection following Commitment, 66 MicH. L. REv. 721, 729-30
(1968).
45 See notes 47, 49, 51, 52 & 53, infra.
46 "If ever it be proven that psychiatry is not reliable, there will be created a
doctrinal abyss into which will sink the whole structure of commitment law, not just
those portions that deal with the harmlessly insane. However, scientific observation of
mental patients over many generations has established the accuracy of psychiatric
theory and the psychiatrist's understanding of the functions of the mind." Projects,
supra note 4, at 829 n.35.
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Treatment for mental illness based on either voluntary or in-
voluntary hospital commitment presupposes a defineable, categorical
mental illness which requires such treatment. One cannot deny that
conditions of extreme mental disturbance of a person require ex-
traordinary care and concern of those around that individual. Never-
theless, a survey of both the legal and psychiatric literature revealsdifferences in definition of mental illness.17 Such differences in label-
ing make assessment of effectiveness of treatment very difficult in-
deed. There is much evidence to indicate that preciseness ofdefinition and general agreement as to nomenclature are lacking inboth the legal and psychiatric approaches to the problem of in-
voluntary commitment. As recently as 1968, the American Psychi-
atric Association adopted a new arrangement of the terminology of
conditions classified under illness." Much heated debate has focused
on this nosological arrangement of diagnoses and some psychiatrists
argue that the functioning of the individual is more important than
the diagnostic label.
There is a valuable contribution made by psychiatry. For adisturbed individual and those around that individual it provides
both medical and psychological techniques for soothing, ameliorating
and aborting the crisis confronting that individual. Techniques
which include acceptance and support for the disturbed individual
and, over a period of time, encouragement of gradual acquisition of
awareness and insight, do help the person to function more effec-
tively in his milieu.
The fact that competent psychiatrists disagree as to diagnosticlabels does not deny the value of psychiatric procedures. It does
raise questions as to the accuracy of predictability and assessment
of results based in part on those labels.49
47 "Obviously, the definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and isdependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs. Usually the use of thephrase 'mental illness' effectively masks the actual norms being applied. And, because
of the unavoidable ambiguous generalities in which the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation describes its diagnostic categories, the diagnostician has the ability to shoehorninto the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason, toput there." Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 18, at 80.48 COMMITTEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS, Am. PSYCHIAT. ASS'N, DIo-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-II) (2) (1968).
49 "Mental illness in short is, as I have earlier suggested, a conclusionary term.Along with Justice Stewart those of us who are trained, i.e., psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, medical men and even perceptive laymen, 'know it when they see it.' In this
sense mental illness is a dynamic label affixed by societal institutions and correlated
with certain individual states deemed pathological by a consensus of those who for
any reason are concerned with the individual in question. This is not to deny that
certain individual psychic states exist which are not in the range of the experimental
spectrum of the majority. These 'medical' states may be subject to a certain amount




The difficulty of identifying predictive patterns of behavior,
mood or mental content that would foretell violent assaultive acts
against another person 0 is compounded by the lack of unanimity in
the definitions of psychiatric nomenclature. There are shadings of
differences in definition of the four major behavioral areas: organic
brain disease, maladaptive personality structure, psychoneurosis and
psychosis. Greater areas of disagreement among psychiatric profes-
sionals exist in the diagnosis and classification of the subgroups
within each main diagnostic group. 1 This is particularly true of the
terms paranoia, schizophrenia and paranoid schizophrenia, labels
which are used broadly in diagnosing psychotic individuals.52 Often
the affixing of the label causes subsequent actions of the individual
to be interpreted in that connotation and helps confirm the diagno-
sis. It has been shown that psychiatric diagnoses are "sensed" by
the trained observer and he then looks for symptoms and diagnostic
clues to substantiate his clinical impression. Although he may
thereby arrive at a different diagnosis, the majority of psychiatric
labels decided upon for a particular patient by the psychiatrist are
pinned on that patient as a result of a total "Gestalt" which the
psychiatrist discerns in the patient. 3
It should be noted that the majority of involuntary commit-
ments for psychiatric illness are made in periods of crisis and tension
for the physician as well as the patient. 4 This has some effect upon
the perspective and reasoned judgment of the psychiatrist who,
in the exercise of his best judgment, deprives another person of his
freedom for a period of time. A study of decision making and
diagnostic judgment in the emergency room shows marked differ-
ences in labels affixed to the patient by the emergency room admit-
labels, however, nosological categories are arbitrary, overlapping and descriptive."
Kaplan, supra note 19, at 29.
50 "Were we to ignore the fact that no definition of dangerous acts has been
agreed upon, our standards of prediction have still been horribly imprecise. On the
armchair assumption that paranoids are dangerous, we have tended to play safe and
incarcerate them all. Assume that the incidence of killing among paranoids is five
times as great as among the normal population. If we use paranoia as a basis for in-
carceration we would commit 199 non-killers in order to protect ourselves from one
killer." Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, supra note 18, at 85.
51 Nathan, Samaraweera, Andberg, & Palch, Syndromes of Psychosis and Psycho-
neurosis, 19 ARCH. GEN. PsYCnTAr. 704 (1968).
52 Katz, Cole & Lowery, Nonspecificity of Diagnosis oj Paranoid Schizophrenia,
11 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 197 (1964).
53 Gauron & Dickinson, Diagnostic Decision Making in Psychiatry, 14 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIAT. 225 (1966).
54 Baxter, Chodorkoff & Underhill, Psychiatric Emergencies: Dispositional De-




ting psychiatrist and the ward psychiatrist later. 5 These studiesindicate, at the least, much variability in affixing diagnostic labels
and reveal the great possibility of error in classifying certain groups
of patients or patterns of behavior as most likely to be associated
with assaultive acts in the future.
Here too, one must question the results of studies which assess
results in terms of diagnostic categories, where there is variability
and some inconsistency in the diagnosis used at the time of imposing
involuntary commitment.
Adequacy of Facilities and Staff
Prior to the passage of the LPS Act, extensive evidence existedthat state hospitals were overcrowded and understaffed.56 Stagnation
of professional competence and sagging morale was evident in the
state hospital personnel.57 The morale of professionl staff was low-
ered further with the cutback in state hospital funding which took
effect July 1, 1967.58
Any consideration of the effectiveness of treatment through in-
voluntary hospital commitment must consider whether staffing,physical facilities and hospital fundings are sufficient to provide the
means of effective treatment. Obviously, stuffing a patient into an
already overcrowded, understaffed and morale-poor ward does not
argue for the value of "treatment" just because he has been invol-
untarily detained there under either a psychiatric certification or a
court order. In fact, a study of 3,000 schizophrenic patients treatedin a state hospital indicated such hospitalization prolonged mental
illness rather than shortened it! 159
Often outpatient care or short hospital stay for crisis interven-tion is of more benefit to the patient than a long term stay in a
hospital setting.60
Two cases in the District of Columbia indicate that treatment
55 Id. at 1545; Mendel & Rapport, Determinants of the Decision for PsychiatricHospitalization, 20 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 321 (1969).
66 DrLEMMA, supra note 5, at 66-69.
57 Id. at 64.
58 Id. & personal observation of the author.
59 Mendel, supra note 5, at 242.60 "We treat a sample of patients who ordinarily would be hospitalized immedi-
ately at the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital and we have been able to keep 95% ofthese patients out of the hospital during the acute phase and 85% in follow-up whichhas gone on for up to two years." Donald G. Langsley M.D., then Director of In-patient Service, Colorado Psychopathic Hospital and now Professor of Psychiatry andChairman of the Department of Psychiatry, University of California Medical School,Davis, California, quoted in DILEMMA, supra note 5, at 77.
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which involves inadequate staffing, overcrowding or imprecise
therapeutic approach may be equivalent to no treatment at all and
be grounds for release of the patient held under involuntary
commitment.
In Lake v. Cameron,6 an elderly woman was confined in St.
Elizabeth's Hospital as an insane person by reason of chronic brain
syndrome. This was associated with aging and demonstrable lack of
memory and ability to make sound judgments. The majority of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the lower court was under
a duty to explore alternatives to involuntary confinement of this
patient as a mentally ill person. Such alternatives included nursing
home and private care.62 The dissent stated that the opinion of the
majority raised issues which had not been presented by the patient
herself. The dissenting judges felt that the issue was only whether
this patient should be released completely or confined for her own
protection. Since, in the trial court's opinion, she was not able to
care for herself, the dissenting opinion of the circuit court was that
she should therefore remain committed.
3
The same court in Rouse v. Cameron
4 discussed the question
of adequacy of treatment. There, a fifteen-year-old boy was taken
into custody for possession of firearms and then committed to St.
Elizabeth's Hospital as insane. The proceeding in Rouse was an
appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus. The court in re-
versing the denial and remanding for further proceedings said:
Continuing failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment cannot
be justified by lack of staff or facilities .... 15
We think law and justice 'require' that we remand for a hearing and
findings on whether appellant is receiving adequate treatment.
66
The opinion in Rouse implies that in actuality there was no
treatment. This situation has had its duplicate in past instances in
California. Individuals have been held in the state hospital for
periods of six to nine months having almost no contact with a psy-
chiatrist, except for the dispensing of psychotropic medication such
as phenothiazines through the intermediary of the nurse.
67 The
argument that this constituted adequate treatment by those pro-
61 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
62 Id. at 660.
63 Id. at 663. Justice Burger, now Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, concurred with the minority dissent.
64 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
65 Id. at 457.
66 Id. at 459.
67 Personal experience of patients of the author.
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ponents of the state hospital system usually boiled down to the
statement, "this is all the treatment that could be given under the
existing conditions of overcrowding of patients and understaffing of
personnel." Undoubtedly, the ubiquity of this type of situation led
to the changes of the law now effective under the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act.
There may be occasion for this same question of adequacy of
treatment to occur under the new enactment. Just because treat-
ment is now focused in a county facility rather than in a state
facility does not change or limit the possibilities of abuse of the legal
provisions. Overcrowding, understaffing and poor morale amongst
staff can occur in small institutions as well as large. Lake and Rouse
indicate that inadequacies to the degree that the patient is only in
custody and not really receiving psychiatric treatment, can be bases
for release of the patient from involuntary commitment."8
Outcome
Assuming accurate diagnostic labeling and reliable prediction
of future behavior is possible, then the effectiveness of involuntary
commitment in protecting society or the individual from himself is
important to assess. Put baldly, the questions are:
First, does involuntary commitment reduce the incidence of
suicide among potentially suicidal patients?
Second, does involuntary commitment reduce the incidence of
assaultive, tortious acts of a person termed "dangerous to others"?
Suicide
Suicide is a problem of great magnitude in the United States.
In 1955 suicide was listed as tenth in order of the leading causes of
death. 9 More than 20,000 people in the United States commit sui-
cide each year. It is estimated that the actual incidence, including
victims who conceal suicidal death in an "accidental" death, ap-
68 "[T]he warning of the Rouse court should be remembered: failure to provide
adequate treatment might render a commitment statute constitutionally suspect. Treat-
ment failures, then might threaten the foundation of the entire scheme." Lewin, supra
note 44, at 725.
"The most dramatic abuse noted in the Ionia study was the retention in confine-
ment, for substantial periods, of patients who were apparently eligible for discharge.
Significantly, the incidence of such prolonged unnecessary confinement was greater
where the patient was without counsel; in those cases in which a private attorney was
retained, the abuse was minimized." Id. at 728.
69 Naftulin, The Potentially Suicidal Patient-Detection and Management in
Office Practice, III J. CAL. MED. Ass'WN 169 (1969).
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proaches 50,000 per year.70 Suicide has as many modes and syn-
dromes of intent as another escape entity, chronic alcoholism. A list
of five areas of characteristic suicidal behavior includes the patient's
considering: ideas of death, sustained ideas or recurrent wishes of
death, frustrated feelings and impulsive behavior leading to suicidal
activities, suicide as the course of last resort, or that sucide repre-
sents a logical end result to life itself. 71 The LAD syndrome in
which "L" stands for loss of a loved one, "A" stands for aggression
(expressed outwardly as homicide or expressed inwardly as suicide),
and "D" stands for acute depression, is present for most suicidal
patients.72
One group of patients who commit suicide successfully are
those who do not give any prior warning to those around them. That
fait accompli obviously is not deterred by involuntary commitment
imposed by someone else. He or she conveys his intent with the
completed self-destructive act itself before any intervention is pos-
sible.73 These patients have been termed "non-communicators" of
70 Id. at 171.
71 Id. at 173.
72 Hirsh, Dynamics of Suicide, 44 MENTAL HYGIENE 274, 278-79 (1950).
73 Case 3. A thirty-five-year-old single white woman was seen at the emergency
room of a local hospital having been brought to that hospital by ambulance. The story
given was that she had been traveling on Highway 99 between Bakersfield and Los
Angeles on a very hot summer day. Her car had overheated, boiled over and she was
forced to pull to the side of the road. She herself became weak and dizzy from heat
prostration, and eventually was brought to the hospital, some thirty miles from the
scene of her physiologic collapse. The patient was hospitalized and given supportive
treatment, including intravenous fluids. She remained in the hospital for the next
thirty-six hours, at which time she was much improved, cheerful and stated that she
felt fine.
She was seen in the doctor's office the following day and there was some discus-
sion of her interpersonal relationships. She was single, having been married and
divorced some years previously. There were no children from that marriage.
She was working as a radio dispatcher for the Sheriff's Department in a com-
munity remote from the county seat. She had a boyfriend with whom she had been
going for several years. There was no indication noted by the physician of depression
or suicidal intent. She seemed an attractive and personable woman enjoying her work
and not unhappy about her single status.
Five days later, a newspaper carried an account of this same young woman who
was found dead in her apartment. Information gleaned later indicated that she had
taken an overdosage of sleeping pills prescribed by a Los Angeles physician some two
weeks prior to the time she was seen in the emergency room. Her associates at her
work knew of some differences of opinion between the deceased and her boyfriend, but
had no indication that she planned to take her life.
It is entirely speculative whether the prostration which was associated with ex-
cessive heat and dehydration seen when she went into the emergency room was
aggravated by emotional factors which the physician did not detect. Certainly at the
hospital and at the follow-up visit in the office, there was no indication of a profound
grief, disturbed emotional content or depression which would have given the examiner
a hint that this woman was planning suicide at that time. Again, it is quite speculative
whether the sleeping pills which she had obtained earlier, were obtained with the
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suicide intent. Studies indicate 70.2 percent of successful suicides in
military service were non-communicators.7 4 In a Veteran's Admin-istration hospital population, 'only 25 percent were non-communica-
tors.5 Other statistics show equally wide variation in warning of
suicidal intent.7 6
For those patients who do give prior warning there is the argu-
ment that hospitalization prevents the very depressed patient from
completing his suicidal intent. In the VA study cited above, "ofthirty-seven of these patients who had left the hospital, twenty had
committed suicide within thirty days. Five such patients were still
resident in the hospital at the time of the successful suicide."7 7 Thequestions posed for the psychiatric staff study are how long suchhospitalization should be continued, and how predictable is thepossibility of the patient still committing suicide after leaving thepsychiatric hospital. The legal question is whether involuntary hos-pitalization prevents eventual suicide.
One report on suicides following discharge from a WesternAustralian psychiatric hospital indicates that "of 494 men and 135
women who committed suicide between 1955 and 1961 in WesternAustralia, 10.3 percent of the men and 17.8 percent of the womenhad, at some time previously, been admitted to a particular acute
psychiatric hospital. 7 8
It has been pointed out that there are a variety of factors whichinfluence a patient's further conduct after he leaves a psychiatrichospital, including those affecting him even before he arrives there.Moreover, environmental factors play a great role in the patient's
response to the possibility of suicide. The study further points outthat the use of tranquilizers did not appear to affect the end result
as far as percentages of successful suicide were concerned.7 9
possibility of suicide in mind, or that the over-dosage was an impulse act performedwithout prior planning before the time of ingestion of the sleeping pills. (Personal
case of the author.)74 Yessler, Gibbs & Becker, On the Communication of Suicidal Ideas, 3 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIAT. 608 (1960).
75 Pokorny, Characteristics of Forty-four Patients Who Subsequently Committed
Suicide, 2 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 314 (1960).76 Haughton, Suicide Prevention Programs-The Current Scene, 124 AM. J.PSYcHIAT. 1692 (1968) ; Levi, Fales, Stein & Sharp, Separation and Attempted Suicide,15 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 158 (1966); DeLong & Robins, The Communication ofSuicidal Intent Prior to Psychiatric Hospitalization: A Study of 87 Patients, 117 AM. J.PSYCHIAT. 695 (1961); Motto, Suicide Attempts, 13 AacHs. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 516(1965); Wilson, Suicide in Psychiatric Patients Who Have Received Hospital Treat-
ment, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 752 (1968).
77 Pokorny, supra note 75, at 322.78 James & Levin, Suicide Following Discharge from Psychiatric Hospital, 10ARCH. GEN. PSYCHMT. 43, 46 (1964).
79 Cohen, Leonard, Farberow, & Shneidman, Tranquilizers and Suicide in theSchizophrenic Patient, 11 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAr. 312 (1964).
1969]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Recent articles discussing treatment for the suicide prone
patient are of significance in that they do not stress the use of
hospitalization, voluntary or involuntary. Rather, emphasis is laid
on person-to-person contact and continued sympathetic support for
the individual.
80
The very profound introjection of the bystander and his feel-
ings into the role of the person who takes his own life prevents the
bystander's impersonal analysis of the situation. The fact that com-
mon law prohibited suicide and that a person who took his own life
was planted at the crossroads of the highways with a stake impaled
through his chest still permeates the thinking of our modern day
approach, prohibiting an individual from taking the responsibility
for ending his own life. Yet our society approves audacious be-
havior in which the risk of death is so great as to excite admiration
or awe. Sky diving, motorcycle riding, mountain climbing and car
driving at excessive speeds with or without the influence of alcohol,
are all ways in which chances of death or maiming are taken some-
times in fool-hardy proportions. These "fringes" are still within
acceptable norms of society. Only when the individual makes some
gesture in solitude, such as turning on the gas jets or ingesting an
excessive number of sleeping pills, is the public sense of decency
outraged to the extent that society must take some action to protect
the individual from himself.
Authorities do not know whether involuntary commitment does
decrease the rate of self-destruction. Such hospitalization rarely re-
sults in any increase of self-responsibility on the part of the patient.
He does not thereby gain any additional insight into the problems
and conflicts which have led him to a suicide-prone posture. Under
the LPS Act there may be slavish obeisance to the involuntary com-
mitment principle even though this may not be in the best interests
of the patient.
Finally, involuntary hospitalization for the suicide gesture
patient may often be a punitive approach without any medical or
psychological benefit to patient, family, or society.
8
' There also
80 Naftulin, supra note 69, at 172.
81 Case 4. A twenty-three-year-old housewife who had been having difficulties
with her husband in her second marriage, took ten valium tablets asserting that she
wanted to do away with herself. She was brought to the emergency room of a private
hospital where measures were taken to evacuate her stomach. Although distraught
and tearful, and further distraught as a result of the vomiting induced by the
stomach-clearing process, she was conscious, aware of reality, and did not indicate
any further suicidal wishes. In keeping with policy at that hospital, psychiatric treat-
ment was suggested including remaining in the psychiatric ward (an open ward) of
the private hospital. The patient agreed to this. Shortly after this a deputy sheriff
who had been called to the house by the wife's husband came to the private hospital
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occurs the situation where the enforced hospitalization becomes a
"payoff" in game playing between husband and wife. As such, the
state enforced involuntary commitment becomes a manipulative tool
wielded either by the suicide-gesturer or the spouse whom the ges-
ture is meant to impress.
Assaultive Behavior, Danger to Others, Homicide
Each time there is a newspaper article relating a particularly
violent and senseless murder of family, friends, or innocent victims,
the public reacts with the almost universal comment: "why didn't
someone do something to put such a person in an asylum so that
he couldn't have performed this tragic act?" The problem lies with
identification of the aggressor with sufficient accuracy so that non-
assaultive or non-homicidal persons will not be unnecessarily de-
prived of their freedom. The accuracy of predicting which persons
will erupt with violent assaultive behavior toward others is very low.
Numerous studies have attempted to identify such persons with
little success.82 Although the label of paranoid schizophrenic is
thought to be the magic word which identifies those potentially
homicidal and assaultive persons, this is not always the case. Various
studies show there is little correlation between certain patterns of
disturbed behavior and later occurrence of antisocial assaultive
acts.83 One study of women who kill indicates the presence of a vari-
ety of personality patterns including the masochistic, the overtly
hostile violent, the covertly hostile violent, the inadequate, the
psychotic and the amoral. 4
Another retrospective analysis of male criminals shows labels
of sociopathy, alcoholism and drug dependence to be the primary
psychiatric conditions associated with criminal actions, that is, in-
juries to persons and injuries to property.85 In this same study,
female criminals showed hysteria, sociopathy, alcoholism and drug
dependence as the primary psychiatric conditions present in women
committing criminal actions. Schizophrenic process, manic-depressive
disease or organic brain disease were not found to be any greater in
the criminal population than in the general population."
and attempted to take the patient to the county psychiatric ward, which had a locked
ward facility. It was only with great difficulty and after considerable argument that
the deputy sheriff was dissuaded from this intention. She remained in the open psy-
chiatric ward voluntarily. The patient returned to her husband and family two days
later. (Personal case of the author.)
82 See notes 84, 85 & 87 infra.
83 See notes 87 & 89 infra.
84 Cole, Fisher & Cole, Women Who Kill, 19 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 1 (1968).
85 Guze, Goodwin & Crane, Criminality and Psychiatric Disorders, 20 ARCH. GEN.




There are conflicting reports as to the presence of warnings
given by the perpetrator of homicide. In a study of "the sudden
murder" in comparison with the habitual criminal offender and the
sexual deviate, the authors state:
Surprisingly when such a person seemed to be getting along quite well,
when society apparently expected him to be even more conforming and
mature, and when he had no one to blame, he would become more and
more tense and angry. At such a time, even a light provocation would
set off the violent surge of rage which would result in murder.87
Still another study indicated that certain syndromes of personality
patterns can be identified retrospectively in persons having com-
mitted apparently senseless murders; but no estimate is made of the
presence of these personality traits in individuals who do not com-
mit murder."'
Of 100 patients who were hospitalized for threats-to-kill, three
patients actually carried out threats in the next five year period.89
This may be an argument for the value of such psychiatric hospital-
ization in that 97 percent did not later carry out their threats, or may
indicate that out of 100 such patients a large majority could not be
identified accurately as potentially homicidal persons.
The same author concludes:
Involuntary commitment often provides only brief protection for so-
ciety. It may further undermine the patient's self-respect as well as
cause resentment toward the relatives who participated in the court
commitment and toward the pychiatrist who was unwilling to treat him
in a local hospital or clinic. Because fear of recommitment to the state
hospital may discourage the patient from seeking psychiatric help when
the next crisis occurs, the risk of homicide may be increased. 90
COMMENTS
The factors of reliability, predictability and effectiveness should
be evaluated when society, through its legal machinery, deprives an
individual of his rights and liberties, even for a short period of time.
The recent volume of law journal articles throughout the nation in-
dicates we in California are not alone troubled by this dilemma.9'
To put the question in its most extreme, although embarrassing
form: If we as physicians and psychiatrists cannot predict reason-
87 Weiss, Lamberti & Blackman, The Sudden Murderer, 2 ARcn. GEN. PSYCHIAT.
669 (1960).
88 Id. at 677.
89 Macdonald, Homicidal Threats, 124 Am. J. PSYCHIAT. 475 (1967).
90 Id. at 481.
91 See notes 18, 19, 32 & 44 supra.
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COMMENTS
ably well which patients need hospital treatment; if we cannot pre-
dict the results of that hospital treatment with any better than
coin-tossing accuracy; and if we cannot always agree on the same
label to be applied to constellations of behavior, how can we expect
legislators to furnish exact guidelines for the involuntary commit-
ment of an individual for his protection or the protection of society?
But if there are no such exact and critical guidelines for de-
privation of liberties, and there is serious question of the value to be
attained by such involuntary commitments, can one persuasively
argue that society's need to protect the public justifies the abridge-
ment of the individual's liberty without due process? Can one
reasonably contend that involuntary hospitalization should be justi-
fied on any reason except the needs and best interests of the person
to be hospitalized. Arguably, even those interests are not best
served by "involuntary" treatment.
CONCLUSION
Medicine and law are concerned that every individual should
have emergency medical aid in time of crisis, regardless of economic
status or social background. The person in the throes of a severe
toxic state, whether from drugs, alcohol or acute emotional dis-
turbance, has a right to emergency care and necessary hospitaliza-
tion. Society has an obligation to make available such emergency
treatment. Such hospitalization and emergency care may be offered
and even imposed while his delirium renders him unable to make a
rational choice or assume self-responsibility. But if such offer of
hospitalization is rejected by the patient, yet imposed for his life
protection, he should have availability of counsel and access to due
process from the onset of that involuntary detention. In a society
which affords its members emergency fire, police, and medical ser-
vice twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, there is no valid
basis for the fact that personal liberties and their legal redress are
suspended on weekends and holidays.
The intent of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Bill in shortening
hospital stays and increasing patient's rights during such hospital-
ization is commendable. It represents significant advances over pre-
vious commitment procedures. Nevertheless, there is still denial of
"due process" in the arbitrary action of involuntary commitment
for a seventy-two hour period without right to counsel or appeal forjudicial hearing. The post-commitment judicial hearing provided
after certification for intensive treatment is not due process.
Emergency care and voluntary hospitalization for the toxic
phase of acute delirium, whether induced by drugs or from emotional
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disturbance, is the right of every person. Access to counsel and
availability of "due process" is also a basic right of every person for
whom involuntary commitment is sought. Such right to counsel and
accompanying legal safeguards should be available to the patient
from the onset of his involuntary commitment and not deferred five
or more days. The legislative enactments governing involuntary
commitment need revision in order that "due process" be made
available from the beginning of any "involuntary commitment"
procedure.
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